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This paper analyzes the sustainability of intergenerational transfers in politico-economic 
equilibrium. Embedding electoral competition for the votes of old and young households in 
the standard Diamond (1965) OLG model, we find that intergenerational transfers naturally 
arise in a Markov perfect equilibrium, even in the absence of altruism, commitment, or trigger 
strategies. Not internalizing the negative effects of transfers for future generations, the 
political process partially resolves the distributive conflict between old and young voters by 
shifting some of the cost of social security to the unborn. As a consequence, transfers in 
politico-economic equilibrium are higher than what is socially optimal. Standard functional 
form assumptions yield closed-form solutions for the politico-economic equilibrium as well 
as the equilibrium supported by the Ramsey policy. The model predicts population ageing to 
lead to larger social security systems, but eventually lower benefits per retiree. Under realistic 
parameter values, it predicts a social-security tax rate close to the actual one, but higher than 
the Ramsey tax rate. Closed-form solutions for the case with endogenous labor supply, tax 
distortions, and multiple policy instruments prove the results to be robust. 
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Many countries sustain pay-as-you-go ﬁnanced social security systems with large intergenera-
tional transfers. Notwithstanding political promises, these transfers are not written in stone.
Beneﬁt levels, contribution rates, retirement age and many other parameters of the social secu-
rity system are politically determined and may, in principle, be altered in the regular legislative
process. Naturally, this triggers questions about the determinants of political support for social
security: Why do democratic societies choose to sustain large intergenerational transfers, even
if these involve net contributions by the majority of voters? And, what are the eﬀects of fun-
damental demographic and economic changes on the political support for, and the size of, these
transfers?
To answer these and related questions, we introduce political choice of social-security trans-
fers in the Diamond (1965) overlapping-generations framework with production and capital
accumulation. Households are assumed to be non-altruistic. As consumers, they are price tak-
ers. As voters, they rationally take into account how policies aﬀect prices and future political
choices; furthermore, they are not bound by past political decisions. The politico-economic
equilibrium therefore features subgame-perfect tax and transfer choices supporting a competi-
tive equilibrium.
In the context of similar environments, models in the literature generally focus on the mo-
tivation of young, working-age voters to support intergenerational transfers. In these models,
political choices reﬂect the preferences of a tax-paying median voter who supports social security
out of fear of otherwise being punished with lower future beneﬁts, due to a link between current
contributions and future beneﬁts that is mostly assumed to operate through trigger strategies.1
While usefully highlighting the connection between current and future political choices, the ex-
clusive emphasis on “expectational” forces driving the political support in these models has
several shortcomings: Equilibrium policy functions are typically not unique, thereby rendering
it diﬃcult to confront the models with the data; positive intergenerational transfers do not arise
in the limit of a ﬁnite-horizon economy; and, in the case of trigger strategies, equilibria are not
robust to small deviations from the assumption of inﬁnite memory.2 More importantly, these
models imply an increase in the share of retirees to have no direct eﬀect on the size of social
security as long as it does not change the identity of the median voter; this stands in contrast
to both empirical evidence and conventional wisdom which holds that inﬂuence of the elderly is
central to the political sustainability of intergenerational transfers.
In contrast, the framework proposed here emphasizes the political inﬂuence of young and old
voters. More speciﬁcally, we model electoral competition under the assumption of probabilistic
voting rather than a pivotal median voter. Reﬂecting the presence of uncertainty in the electoral
process and inducing a continuous mapping from candidates’ electoral platforms to their vote
shares, the probabilistic-voting assumption allows us to capture gradual diﬀerences in the sup-
port for social security, even in a stark two-period-lived overlapping-generations environment.
In equilibrium, vote-seeking candidates aim at maximizing the welfare of all voters, weighted by
their political inﬂuence—not only the median voter. This introduces a fundamental source of
political support for intergenerational redistribution that interacts with the expectational forces
1See Cooley and Soares (1999), Boldrin and Rustichini (2000) or Rangel (2003). Forni (2005) presents a model
where anticipated punishments are a function of the capital stock, rather than the history of previous political
choices.
2See Bhaskar (1998) who shows that informational constraints in overlapping generations games with a strictly
dominant action for the old imply that the unique pure strategy equilibrium is in Markov strategies.
2stressed in the literature. The probabilistic-voting assumption has an additional important ad-
vantage: In contrast to the median-voter setup, it can easily handle multi-dimensional policy
spaces. This enables us to investigate the political support for social-security transfers if these
transfers compete with other policy instruments.
We restrict the attention to Markov perfect equilibria where policy choices are only a func-
tion of the natural state variables (in our case, the capital stock per worker). Due to the
fundamental redistributive motive, positive transfers arise even in the absence of commitment,
altruism, trigger strategies, capital overaccumulation, and an inﬁnite time horizon. Moreover,
these positive transfers correspond to the unique equilibrium policy function in the limit of the
ﬁnite horizon economy. Political competition pushes intergenerational transfers to a point where
the consumption ratio of old and young households exceeds their relative political inﬂuence per
capita. Raising the relative consumption of old households thus far maximizes the expected vote
share of political candidates, because the opposition by young voters against intergenerational
transfers is weakened by the fact that such transfers depress capital accumulation, thereby af-
fecting future returns and policy choices and indirectly reducing the net cost of transfers to the
young.3
The transfers sustained in politico-economic equilibrium are higher than those implemented
under the Ramsey policy maximizing the discounted sum of the welfare of current and future gen-
erations. “Excess redistribution” arises because electoral competition leads the political process
to internalize the positive general equilibrium and policy eﬀects of lower capital accumulation
for current voters, but not the negative consequences borne by later cohorts—the distributive
conﬂicts between old and young voters are partly resolved by shifting some of the costs of the
transfers to future generations. The government implementing the Ramsey policy, in contrast,
internalizes both the positive and the negative implications of lower capital accumulation. It
pursues social security policy only to the extent that the implied intergenerational redistribution
increases the weighted average of the welfare of all current and future generations (taking tax
distortions into account). Moreover, the Ramsey policy implements exactly the same trans-
fers as those sustained in a hypothetical politico-economic equilibrium with symmetric political
weights, where young voters neither account for the general equilibrium beneﬁts of depressed
capital accumulation nor the eﬀect on future political choices (“double-myopic” equilibrium).
These results follow under general conditions, namely constant returns to scale and equality
of households’ and the government’s time discount factors. Once particular functional form
assumptions are imposed (logarithmic preferences and Cobb-Douglas technology), the model
yields closed-form solutions. This stands in sharp contrast to much of the literature which must
resort to numerical characterizations. For standard parameter values and symmetric political
weights, our analytical results predict a steady-state social-security tax rate close to the actual
tax rate in the U.S. If young voters did not account for the general equilibrium and policy
eﬀects of decreased capital accumulation, this equilibrium tax rate would drop to a lower level,
which also represents the Ramsey tax rate. More generally, the model predicts the introduction
and extension of social security programs in response to lower population growth rates or higher
labor shares, a hump-shaped relationship between the population growth rate and social-security
beneﬁts per retiree, higher consumption levels of old households than young households, and
stronger support for social security in closed economies. These predictions are broadly consistent
with existing empirical evidence.
When we enrich the economic environment relative to existing models in the literature by
3Kotlikoﬀ and Rosenthal (1990) model the incentive of the young as an interest group to monopolize the supply
of capital. They assume commitment and do not model the political process.
3introducing endogenous labor supply and tax distortions, equilibrium can still be characterized
in closed form. Modeling the eﬀects of policy on the labor market is important for at least two
reasons. First, because tax distortions constitute a ﬁrst-order consideration in their own right
in the context of redistributive ﬁscal policy, and second, because the presence of tax distortions
introduces other mechanisms than social-security transfers to manipulate equilibrium prices and
quantities. Modeling tax distortions therefore permits us to investigate whether intergener-
ational transfers are sustained even if they compete with other policy instruments and thus,
whether a central driving force emphasized in the previous literature is robust. (Such a robust-
ness check was generally not possible in the previous literature, since the median-voter setup is
ill-suited for the analysis of multi-dimensional political preference aggregation.) Introducing a
second form of transfers, paid to the young, we ﬁnd that tax distortions in combination with
this additional transfer make it possible to aﬀect young households’ savings and labor supply
without having to resort to intergenerational transfers. Nevertheless, social security continues to
be sustained in politico-economic equilibrium. In fact, the equilibrium tax rate funding social-
security transfers (but not total transfers) turns out to be identical to that in the more basic
environment. The Ramsey government, in contrast, implements a lower social-security tax rate
than when taxes are non-distorting.
Our work extends a growing literature on dynamic politico-economic equilibrium, with voters
sequentially choosing their preferred policies under rational expectations about the eﬀects on
future equilibrium outcomes (see, for example, Krusell, Quadrini and R´ ıos-Rull, 1997; Hassler,
Rodr´ ıguez Mora, Storesletten and Zilibotti, 2003). As mentioned above, it also relates to an
extensive literature on the sources of political support for intergenerational transfers. In contrast
to most models in that literature, our approach does not rely on altruism, commitment, or
expected punishments (as imposed, respectively, by Hansson and Stuart (1989) and Tabellini
(1990); Cukierman and Meltzer (1989), Conesa and Krueger (1999), and Persson and Tabellini
(2002); and Bohn (1999), Cooley and Soares (1999), Boldrin and Rustichini (2000), Rangel
(2003), and Forni (2005)), nor does it restrict policy choices to be binary or population growth to
be suﬃciently high (to render the economy dynamically ineﬃcient), as do some previous models.
More generally, our approach stresses the gradual resolution of the fundamental distributive
conﬂict between old and young voters, in addition to the expectational forces shaping this
conﬂict, in particular those relating to general equilibrium eﬀects as stressed by Cooley and
Soares (1999), Boldrin and Rustichini (2000) and others. The probabilistic-voting assumption
that is central to analyzing this gradual resolution only appears to have been employed in the
social security context by Grossman and Helpman (1998). However, their model does not feature
any economic decisions and therefore, no interaction between the political and the economic
sphere.4
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the model, derives
the equilibrium allocation under probabilistic voting and the Ramsey policy, and confronts
implications of the model with existing empirical evidence. Section 3 introduces endogenous
labor supply, tax distortions, and multiple policy instruments. Section 4 concludes.
4After ﬁnishing the ﬁrst draft of this paper, we learned about independent work by Katuscak (2002) who also
adopts the probabilistic-voting assumption, but does not endogenize factor returns as we do.
42 The Model
We consider an overlapping generations economy inhabited by cohorts of representative agents.
Households live two periods. Young households in period t inelastically supply labor at wage wt
and pay a labor income tax levied at rate τt. (We relax the assumption of inelastic labor supply
later.) Disposable income is allocated to consumption, c1,t, and savings, st; the latter yields a
gross rate of return, Rt+1. The consumption of old households, c2,t+1, equals the gross return
on savings, stRt+1, plus a pension beneﬁt, bt+1. The population grows at the rate ν − 1, such
that the ratio of young to old households is given by ν > 0.
Output is produced using an aggregate production function with constant returns to scale.
Per-capita output in period t positively depends on the capital-labor ratio which, in turn, is
proportional to the per-capita savings of the cohort born in t−1. Factor markets are competitive
and factor prices thus correspond to marginal products. The wage and the gross interest rate are
given by wt = w(st−1) and Rt = R(st−1), strictly increasing and decreasing in st−1, respectively.
Conditional on prices and policies (that is, wt,Rt+1,τt, and bt+1), the indirect utility function
of a young household of cohort t is given by
Ut = max
st
u(c1,t) + βu(c2,t+1), (1)
subject to the budget constraint described above. The felicity function u(·) is continuously
diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing and concave, and satisﬁes limc→0 u′(c) = ∞; β ∈ (0,1).
The government sector consists of a social security administration running a pay-as-you-
go system.5 Old age pensions are ﬁnanced out of the payroll taxes paid by the young: the
pay-as-you-go budget constraint of the social security administration reads
bt = τtνwt. (2)
At this point, the sole policy instrument of the social security administration is the payroll tax
rate, τt, imposed on the labor income of the young. This tax rate is determined in the political
process (described in more detail below), subject to a non-negativity constraint, τt ≥ 0.
The timing of events is as follows: At the beginning of period t, the tax rate to be imposed
in the current period is determined in the political process. When deciding which candidate to
support, voters anticipate how each candidate’s policy platform will aﬀect subsequent economic
and political decisions. The wage rate and the return on the predetermined savings of the old,
together with the tax rate implemented by the winning candidate, determine the consumption
of the old and the disposable income of the young. Young households then turn to their role as
consumers and choose how much to save.
When deciding (as voters) on τt and (as consumers) on st, young households form expecta-
tions about future beneﬁts, bt+1. In a Markovian equilibrium, these beneﬁts depend on a set of
“fundamental” state variables, St+1: bt+1 = νw(st)τ(St+1). Clearly, st is an element of St+1,
since st aﬀects future wages and gross returns and therefore, the incomes of next period’s voters.
Having said this, we conjecture st to be suﬃcient for St+1, i.e., τ(St+1) = τ(st). We will return
to this point later when discussing the political institutions in place.6
5Introducing a fully funded component of social security is inconsequential, as long as the government does
not force households to save more than they would voluntarily save, and investment opportunities are the same
for households and the social security administration.
6We assume τ( ) to be single-valued, as is the case in the limit of the ﬁnite-horizon economy.
5To characterize the politico-economic equilibrium, we proceed by backward induction. We
start by analyzing the economic choices subject to given prices and policies, and then consider
the preferences over policies (and thus, prices) and their aggregation in the political process.
2.1 Choice of Individual Savings
The optimal savings decision of a young household in cohort t is characterized by the Euler
equation
u′(c1,t) = βRt+1u′(c2,t+1).
Since households are atomistic they take aggregate savings and thus, next period’s return on
capital and, through τ(st) and w(st), social-security beneﬁts as given. Households only take
into account that higher individual savings increase their future ﬁnancial wealth.
Conditional on τ(st), the Euler equation maps disposable income, wt(1−τt), and aggregate
savings into the optimal savings of an individual household. We denote this mapping by the
function
Si(wt(1 − τt);st,τ(st)).
An equilibrium aggregate savings function, S(wt(1 − τt);τ(·)), is deﬁned as a ﬁxed point of the
functional equation S(y;τ(·)) = Si(y;S(y;τ(·)),τ(S(y;τ(·)))) ∀y ≥ 0.
2.2 Choice of Tax Rate
To characterize society’s choice of program size, we ﬁrst consider the welfare implications for old
and young households in general equilibrium. These welfare implications induce group-speciﬁc
preferences over policies. In a second step, we consider the aggregation of these preferences
through the political process.
Old households prefer as high a tax rate, τt, as possible. This follows directly from the fact
that bt increases in τt, while st−1Rt is independent of τt and the tax bill for funding the beneﬁts
is solely shouldered by the young. For an old household, the welfare eﬀect of a marginal increase
in the tax rate is given by
u′(c2,t)wtν. (3)
For young households, a change in the tax rate gives rise to more complex welfare implica-










(An envelope argument implies that the indirect welfare eﬀects through changes in the house-
hold’s savings cancel.) The ﬁrst, negative term reﬂects the cost of higher tax payments. The
second term reﬂects the welfare implications due to induced changes in the fundamental state
variable: By shifting disposable income from the young generation (with a positive marginal
propensity to save) to the old generation (with a propensity equal to zero), an increase in the
tax rate reduces aggregate savings. This increases next period’s return on savings, with a pos-
itive welfare eﬀect for the young, and alters social-security beneﬁts, with welfare eﬀects whose
sign is unclear in general. The total “general equilibrium” eﬀect of depressed aggregate savings
as reﬂected in the second term of (4) is thus positive, as long as the subsequent political choice
of beneﬁts does not strongly increase with aggregate savings.
6The extent to which the group-speciﬁc welfare implications of a change in the tax rate govern
the actual policy choice by political decision makers depends on the political institutions in place
to aggregate old and young voters’ preferences. Previous literature has generally adopted the
median-voter assumption according to which political decision makers exclusively represent the
interests of young voters (as long as ν > 1). This assumption implies that the total welfare
eﬀect for young voters as given in (4) must exceed zero over some range to sustain positive taxes
in equilibrium. In other words, the general equilibrium eﬀect must be positive and outweigh
the direct cost of higher taxes, at least for low levels of τt. This condition can only be satisﬁed
if either the elasticity of the interest rate with respect to savings is very high, or the eﬀect of
higher taxes on the subsequent political choice of beneﬁts is strong and positive. Many authors
have assumed the latter, often introducing artiﬁcial state variables that allow to sustain trigger
strategies and thus, arbitrarily large elasticities of future beneﬁts with respect to current choices
of tax rate.7
Median-voter models and their implied focus on expectational forces to sustain intergenera-
tional transfers have several problems. First, the emphasis on expectational forces implies that
equilibrium policy functions are typically not unique, thereby rendering it diﬃcult to confront
the models with the data. The reliance on expectational forces also implies that the existence
of positive equilibrium transfers hinges on the auxiliary assumptions of an inﬁnite horizon and,
in the case of trigger strategies, inﬁnite memory (see Bhaskar (1998)). Second, median-voter
models have extreme implications. On the one hand, the mapping from candidates’ policy plat-
forms into vote shares is discontinuous: A marginal change in the gross population growth rate,
ν, around unity triggers a large jump in the equilibrium tax rate. On the other hand, variations
in ν outside a neighborhood of unity have no direct eﬀect on the size of social security. These
implications are stark, in particular in our setup with only two groups of voters, and stand in
contrast to both empirical evidence and conventional wisdom which holds that the inﬂuence
of the elderly is central to the political sustainability of intergenerational transfers. Finally,
the median-voter setup generally does not allow us to analyze multi-dimensional policy spaces.
Therefore, median-voter models must remain silent on whether social security constitutes the
optimal policy instrument to manipulate general equilibrium eﬀects, putting the robustness of
ﬁndings in the literature into doubt.
For these reasons, and because we consider it to be another useful benchmark, we replace the
assumption of a pivotal median voter by the assumption of probabilistic voting. Probabilistic-
voting models acknowledge the fact that voters support a party not only for its policy platform,
but also for party characteristics like “ideology” that are orthogonal to the fundamental policy
dimensions of interest; these characteristics are permanent and cannot be credibly altered in
the course of electoral competition. The valuation of these party characteristics diﬀers across
voters (even if they agree about the preferred policy platform) and is subject to random aggregate
shocks, realized after parties have chosen their platforms. This renders the probability of winning
a voter’s support as a function of the competing policy platforms continuous, in contrast to the
median-voter setup, and allows us to analyze multi-dimensional policy spaces (as is done in
Section 3).
In a Nash equilibrium with two parties maximizing their expected vote share, both candidates
propose the same policy platform.8 This platform maximizes a convex combination of the
7See, for example, Cooley and Soares (1999), Boldrin and Rustichini (2000), or Rangel (2003). Forni (2005),
in contrast, restricts the set of state variables to the fundamental state variable. He ﬁnds that, over some range,
multiple policy functions can exist, whose steep negative slope is suﬃcient to generate the desired eﬀect.
8See Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) and Persson and Tabellini (2000) for discussions of probabilistic voting.
7objective functions of all groups of voters, where the weights reﬂect the group size and sensitivity
of voting behavior to policy changes. Groups caring relatively more about policy than party
characteristics have more political inﬂuence, since they are more likely to shift their vote from
one party to the other in response to small changes in the proposed platform. In equilibrium,
these groups of “swing voters” thus tilt policy in their own favor. If all voters are equally
responsive to changes in the policy platform, electoral competition implements the utilitarian
optimum with respect to voters.
In the context of our model, the probabilistic-voting assumption implies that the welfare of
the old receives some weight in the objective function maximized by the political process, even
if the median voter is young. This implication seems very realistic. Indeed, it is frequently
argued that old voters exert stronger political inﬂuence per capita than young voters in the
social security context, because intergenerational transfers are a more salient issue for old than
for young voters (see, for example, Dixit and Londregan (1996, p. 1144) and Grossman and
Helpman (1998, p. 1309)). While this is reassuring, our main results will not require the old to
exert disproportionate inﬂuence.










st = S(wt(1 − τt);τ(·)),
τt+1 = τ(st),
household budget constraints.
Here, the weights ω1 and ω2 reﬂect the sensitivity of the voting behavior of young and old
households, respectively, with respect to changes in a candidate’s proposed policy platform.
The household budget constraint incorporates the beneﬁt, wage, and return functions. Next
period’s policy choice as a function of the state is taken as given, reﬂecting our assumption of
Markov equilibrium. An interior optimum for the candidates is characterized by the condition
that the weighted sum of (3) and (4) (where the weights are given by ω2 and ω1, respectively)
be equal to zero. Note that our earlier assumption according to which st is the only element of
St+1, is indeed consistent.
In a rational expectations equilibrium, the anticipated policy function coincides with the
optimal one. A rational expectations equilibrium is thus given by a ﬁxed point τ(·) of the
functional equation τ(st−1) = argmaxτt≥0 W(st−1,τt;τ(·)) ∀st−1 ≥ 0. This probabilistic voting
equilibrium under rational expectations contrasts with the probabilistic voting equilibrium under
“double-myopia”, where naive voters expect future tax rates and factor prices to be independent
of their aggregate savings choice.
It is instructive to compare the politico-economic equilibrium with the allocation imple-
mented by a benevolent government, subject to the same set of technological, institutional,
and competitive-equilibrium constraints. Conditional on an intergenerational discount factor

















si = S(wi(1 − τi);τi+1),i ≥ t,
household budget constraints.
Access to a commitment technology implies that the Ramsey program involves the choice of a
sequence of tax rates. This sequence need not be optimal ex post and thus, need not satisfy
ﬁxed-point conditions as in the politico-economic equilibrium. More importantly, in contrast
to the political process, the benevolent government values the welfare of all households, not
only those currently alive (and voting). It takes into account, for example, how a change in the
current tax rate aﬀects future wages and thus, the consumption of the next generation. (Absent
binding non-negativity constraints on tax rates, the Ramsey policy supports the social-planner
allocation, see below. In the setup analyzed in Section 3, this will no longer be the case. To
avoid confusion, we therefore always refer to the benchmark as the “Ramsey equilibrium” rather
than the “social-planner allocation.”)
2.3 Equilibrium
Turning to the characterization of the equilibrium allocation, our objective is twofold. First,
we want to demonstrate that the general equilibrium beneﬁts of depressed aggregate savings
signiﬁcantly reduce the opposition of young voters against intergenerational transfers. To show
this point, we compare the politico-economic equilibrium under rational expectations to the
politico-economic equilibrium under double-myopia. Second, we want to demonstrate that in-
tergenerational transfers in politico-economic equilibrium are too high, relative to the level
chosen by a benevolent government.
For analytical purposes, it is useful to ﬁrst consider the social-planner allocation, i.e., the op-
timal allocation subject to resource, but not private sector implementability constraints. Letting
f(·) denote the economy’s production function in intensive form, the social-planner allocation
is characterized by the ﬁrst-order conditions
ρu′(c1,t+i) = νβu′(c2,t+i),i ≥ 0, (5)
u′(c1,t+i) = βf′(st+i/ν)u′(c2,t+i+1),i ≥ 0.
According to the ﬁrst condition, the planner’s marginal rate of substitution between the con-
sumption of young and old households, ρu′(c1,t+i)/(βu′(c2,t+i)), is equal to the corresponding
marginal rate of transformation, ν. According to the ﬁrst and second condition, the planner’s
marginal rate of substitution between consumption in two successive periods, u′(c1,t+i)/(ρu′(c1,t+i+1)),
is equal to the corresponding intertemporal marginal rate of transformation, f′(st+i/ν)/ν.
In contrast to the social planner, the Ramsey government is not only bound by the re-
source constraint but must also satisfy the implementability constraint of the private sector
(i.e., st+i = S(wt+i(1 − τt+i);τt+i+1)) and the non-negativity constraint on tax rates. The for-
mer constraint is inconsequential because the social planner’s dynamic ﬁrst-order condition is
identical to the household’s Euler equation, which holds under the Ramsey policy.9 Conditional
9This follows from the fact that Rt+i = f
′(st+i−1/ν) in a competitive equilibrium.
9on the intergenerational wealth distribution, the savings choices induced by the Ramsey policy
therefore conform with the social planner’s investment policy. Moreover, due to their identical
marginal rates of substitution between consumption of young and old households, the planner
and the government aim at the same wealth distribution across cohorts. An interior Ramsey
policy (i.e., a Ramsey policy without binding non-negativity constraints on tax rates) therefore
implements the social-planner allocation and thus, is time-consistent. The latter also holds true
if the non-negativity constraint binds.10
In the remainder of the paper, we assume that the government weighs generations by their
size, and discounts the welfare of future generations according to the household’s discount factor,
i.e., we let ρ ≡ βν (implying βν < 1). The Ramsey policy therefore aims at equalizing per-capita
consumption of old and young households at any point in time. We summarize the preceding
discussion as follows:
Proposition 1. Consider the Ramsey equilibrium. Unless otherwise mentioned, suppose that
strictly positive intergenerational transfers are sustained.
(i) c1,t = c2,t ∀t.
(ii) In steady state, βR = 1 and the economy is dynamically eﬃcient (since βν < 1).
(iii) The Ramsey policy implements the same allocation as the social planner, and is therefore
unique. Independently of whether transfers are positive, the Ramsey policy is time-consistent.
In politico-economic equilibrium, political inﬂuence enters the picture. The political weights
of households currently alive, ω1 and ω2, replace the government’s intergenerational weights.
Equally importantly, some eﬀects internalized by the benevolent government—in particular, the
welfare eﬀects of an induced change in aggregate savings on future generations—are no longer
accounted for. In the politico-economic equilibrium with rational expectations, candidates only
internalize the direct eﬀect due to the social-security transfer from young to old households, and
the indirect welfare eﬀects on the current young due to the change in next period’s interest rate
and social-security beneﬁts. In the following, we denote these indirect welfare eﬀects (which are




















where the second line follows from constant returns to scale. Letting λW
t denote the non-negative
multiplier on the constraint that taxes be non-negative, we thus ﬁnd the following ﬁrst-order





+ Bt + λW
t = 0, λW
t τt = 0. (6)
Under double-myopia, none of the indirect welfare eﬀects due to induced changes in aggregate
savings is internalized. The ﬁrst-order condition with respect to τt for the politico-economic






t = 0, λM
t τt = 0, (7)
where λM
t denotes the non-negative multiplier on the constraint that taxes be non-negative.
10Appendices A.1 and A.2 oﬀer a more formal discussion.
10Let ω ≡ ω2/ω1 denote the relative weight of the old in the political process. Conditions (6)
and (7) imply the following result:11
Proposition 2. Consider the politico-economic equilibrium under rational expectations. Sup-
pose that strictly positive intergenerational transfers are sustained and Bt > 0, ω = 1.
(i) c1,t < c2,t ∀t.
(ii) In steady state, βR > 1 and the economy is dynamically eﬃcient, savings are lower and
the tax rate is higher than in the Ramsey equilibrium.
Consider the politico-economic equilibrium under double-myopia. Suppose that strictly pos-
itive intergenerational transfers are sustained and ω = 1.
(iii) c1,t = c2,t ∀t.
(iv) In steady state, βR = 1, the economy is dynamically eﬃcient, and the allocation is
identical to the Ramsey allocation.
Results (i) and (ii) follow directly from (6). With the balanced consumption proﬁle imple-
mented in the Ramsey equilibrium, the direct welfare eﬀect of a transfer from young to old
households is equal to zero. But Bt > 0 implies that there are additional indirect beneﬁts from
higher taxes. In political equilibrium, taxes and the relative consumption of old households are
therefore higher than in the Ramsey equilibrium. From the household’s Euler equation, c1 < c2
implies that the steady-state interest rate is higher and savings are lower than in the Ramsey
equilibrium.
Results (iii) and (iv) follow directly from (7). With balanced political inﬂuence, the po-
litical process equalizes the consumption of old and young households, parallel to the Ramsey
allocation. Since in steady state, the interest rate is the same in the Ramsey equilibrium and
the double-myopic equilibrium, the condition c1 = c2 and therefore w(1 − τ) − s = sR + ντw
imply that the two tax rates are also the same. Both in the rational-expectations and the
double-myopic equilibrium, relatively stronger political inﬂuence of the old (ω > 1) increases
the support for social security and the relative consumption of old households.
If lower savings indirectly beneﬁt young voters and higher taxes depress savings, then re-
distribution from the young to the old beyond the extent under the Ramsey policy (c1 = c2)
constitutes the vote maximizing platform in the electoral competition game with fully rational
voters, even if voters have symmetric political inﬂuence. Proposing relatively low young-age
consumption maximizes the expected vote share of political candidates, because the opposition
of young voters against intergenerational transfers is weakened by the fact that such transfers
depress capital accumulation, indirectly reducing the net cost of transfers borne by the young by
improving their intertemporal terms of trade. The mirror image of the improved terms of trade
for young households is lower wages for the next, yet unborn generation. But in contrast to the
benevolent government, the political process does not account for this fall in wages (beyond its
eﬀect on lower social-security beneﬁts), because it only represents the interests of voters cur-
rently alive. “Excessive” social-security transfers, i.e., transfers beyond the level implemented
by the Ramsey government, are therefore sustained by shifting some of the cost of these transfers
to future generations. With double-myopic voters, in contrast, the political process does not
only disregard the negative welfare eﬀects of social security for future generations, but also the
positive general equilibrium eﬀects and policy repercussions of concern to young voters. The
force sustaining excessive transfers therefore disappears.
11We assume double-myopic expectations to be self-conﬁrming: Double-myopic voters correctly anticipate next
period’s factor prices and policy choices, but not the price or policy functions.
11If we replaced the probabilistic-voting assumption by the median-voter assumption com-
monly adopted in the social-security literature (corresponding to ω = 0), the model would
replicate the conventional ﬁnding that threats of “punishment”, for example backed by trigger
strategies, are needed to sustain transfers in politico-economic equilibrium. With probabilistic
voting and symmetric political inﬂuence, in contrast, transfers are not only sustained in the ab-
sence of trigger strategies, but they are excessively high. Trigger strategies may thus be needed
to reduce rather than support intergenerational transfers.
To go further and derive closed-form solutions, we impose functional form assumptions:
Assumption 1. Preferences are logarithmic: u(c) ≡ ln(c). The production function is of the
Cobb-Douglas type: w(s) ≡ Aα(s/ν)1−α, R(s) ≡ A(1 − α)(s/ν)−α, A > 0,0 < α < 1.
Here, α denotes the labor share, s/ν the capital-labor ratio, and A the level of productivity.
Under Assumption 1, household savings are given by
st = wt(1 − τt) −








(1 − τt) −
αstτt+1
(1 + β)(1 − α)
,






(1 − α)(1 + β) + ατt+1
≡ s1−α




Aανα−1(1 − τt)(1 − α(1 − τt+1))




t−1 Aνα(1 − α(1 − τt)) ≡ s1−α
t−1 · δ(τt).
If current and future tax rates are chosen by the benevolent government, these equations repre-
sent the equilibrium aggregate savings and consumption functions. In politico-economic equilib-
rium, in contrast, where future tax rates generally depend on future state variables, the equations
represent the equilibrium aggregate savings and consumption functions only in the special case
of τ′(st) = 0. In this case—which will be of particular interest—we also have
Bt =
(1 − α)αβ(1 − τt+1)νω1
(1 − τt)(1 − α(1 − τt+1))
> 0 ∀τt,τt+1 ∈ [0,1).
Note that, in “autarky” (i.e., if all tax rates are set to zero), the ratio c2,t/c1,t is given by
ˆ c ≡
(1 − α)(1 + β)ν
α
,
independent of the capital-labor ratio. Moreover, with a time-invariant tax rate τ, the relative




ˆ c + ντ
1 − τ
. (9)
Equation (9) implies that a particular time-invariant tax rate,
τG ≡
1 − ˆ c
1 + ν
=
α − (1 − α)(1 + β)ν
α(1 + ν)
,
12suﬃces to equalize the per-capita consumption of old and young households in all periods,
and thus to attain the social-planner allocation. If ˆ c ≤ 1, this tax rate does not violate the
non-negativity constraint of the Ramsey program. Proposition 1 thus implies that τt = τG ∀t
constitutes the unique and time-consistent Ramsey policy. If ˆ c > 1, in contrast, such that old
households consume more than young households in autarky, setting τt equal to τG violates the
non-negativity constraint. In that case, the Ramsey policy amounts to keeping all tax rates at
their constrained value, τt = 0 ∀t.12
Proposition 3. Consider the Ramsey equilibrium. Suppose that Assumption 1 holds.
The (unique) Ramsey policy features time-invariant tax rates, τt = max(τG,0) ∀t. The
steady state under the Ramsey policy is globally stable and the transition to steady state is
unique.
The result follows from (8), Proposition 1, the above discussion, and Lemma 1 in Appen-
dix A.3 which proves stability. If ˆ c < 1 and therefore taxes are strictly positive, the steady-state
level of savings is sG ≡ (A(1 − α)β)1/αν, which is lower than the autarky level of savings,
sA ≡ (Aαβνα−1/(1 + β))1/α. If ˆ c ≥ 1 and therefore taxes are zero, steady-state savings are
at their autarky level, sA. Given that {τt} equals {max(τG,0)}, the complete transition of all
endogenous variables is fully characterized by the initial condition, st−1, and the coeﬃcients
γ(τt,τt+1), δ(τt), and z(τt,τt+1).
Consider next the politico-economic equilibrium under rational expectations. First, we re-
strict attention to the case where the candidates face a ﬂat tax function (imposed by the winner
of the electoral competition game in the next period), given by τt+1. Diﬀerentiating W(·) with
respect to τt and deﬁning
ˆ d ≡
(1 − α)(1 + β(1 − α))ν
αω
= ˆ c






αω(1 − ˆ d) − ατt(ω + ν(1 + β(1 − α)))
(1 − α(1 − τt))(1 − τt)
.
For all τt ∈ [0,1), this derivative is strictly negative if ˆ d > 1. If ˆ d < 1, in contrast, this derivative
is strictly positive up to the strictly positive tax rate
τW ≡
αω(1 − ˆ d)
α(ω + ν(1 + β(1 − α)))
=
αω − (1 − α)(1 + β(1 − α))ν
α(ω + ν(1 + β(1 − α)))
12Under Assumption 1, G( ) is given by
G(st−1,{τi}
∞
i=t) = (ln[st−1] + ln[z(τt,τt+1)]νβ + ln[z(τt+1,τt+2)]ν
2β
2 + ...)
(1 + ν)(1 − α)
1 − νβ(1 − α)
+(ln[δ(τt)] + νβ ln[δ(τt+1)] + ...)
+(ν ln[γ(τt,τt+1)] + ν
2β ln[γ(τt+1,τt+2)] + ...).
Substituting the deﬁnitions of γ(τt,τt+1), δ(τt), and z(τt,τt+1), diﬀerentiating with respect to τi,i = t,t + 1,...,
and using ˆ c > 1 yields the result.




t−1 δ(τt)] + ν{ln[s
1−α




= ln[st−1][(1 − α)(ω + ν) + (1 − α)
2νβ] + ω ln[δ(τt)] + ν ln[γ(τt,τt+1)] + ln[z(τt,τt+1)](1 − α)νβ + νβ ln[δ(τt+1)].
Substituting the deﬁnitions of γ(τt,τt+1), δ(τt), and z(τt,τt+1) and diﬀerentiating yields the result.
13rendering the numerator equal to zero, and negative thereafter. These observations lead to
Proposition 4. Consider the politico-economic equilibrium under rational expectations. Sup-
pose that Assumption 1 holds.
(i) There exists an equilibrium with a ﬂat policy function, τ(s) = max(τW,0). In this
equilibrium, the steady state is globally stable and the transition to steady state is unique.
(ii) The ﬂat policy function is the unique equilibrium policy function in the limit of the
ﬁnite-horizon economy.
Result (i) follows from (8), the properties of ∂W(·)/∂τt, and Lemma 1 in Appendix A.3
which proves stability. A ﬂat policy function is consistent with equilibrium because the tax rate
maximizing W(·) is independent of the state variable as long as next period’s tax function is also
independent of the capital-labor ratio. If ω > 1 − νβ(1 − α) (and thus, in particular, if ω ≥ 1),
then τW > τG. Moreover, if ˆ d < 1, then the policy function is strictly positive and the steady-
state level of savings, sW ≡ ν(A(1−α)β/(ω +βν(1−α)))1/α, falls short of sG and sA. If ˆ d ≥ 1,
the policy function is given by the autarky policy function, τ(s) = 0, and steady-state savings
are at their autarky level, sA. Positive transfers are sustained in politico-economic equilibrium,
but not under the Ramsey policy, if ˆ d < 1 and ˆ c > 1, or ˆ c > 1 and ω > ω ≡ ˆ c
1+β(1−α)
1+β . Since {τt}
equals {max(τW,0)}, the complete transition of all endogenous variables is fully characterized.
For the uniqueness result under (ii), consider the ﬁnal period, T, in the ﬁnite-horizon econ-
omy. The consumption of old and young households in T is given by
c1,T = wT(1 − τT) = s1−α
T−1Aανα−1(1 − τT),
c2,T = s1−α
T−1Aνα(1 − α(1 − τT)),
respectively. If ω1/c1,T exceeds ω2/c2,T in the absence of transfers, then the equilibrium tax







αω − (1 − α)ν
α(ω + ν)
.
It follows that the policy function satisﬁes τT(sT−1) = max(
αω−(1−α)ν
α(ω+ν) ,0) and therefore, that it
is ﬂat. Moving to period T − 1, we know from above that ﬂatness of the policy function in T
implies ﬂatness of the policy function in T − 1, in particular τT−1(sT−2) = max(τW,0). The
same logic applies for all preceding periods.
A parallel argument shows that the policy function in the limit of the ﬁnite-horizon economy
with myopic voters is also unique. Moreover, from Proposition 2, the steady-state tax rate in
this economy is the same as under the Ramsey policy if ω = 1.
Similarly to τG, τW increases in α and decreases in β and ν. To better understand this result,
it is instructive to return to the ﬁrst-order condition (6). For λW
t = 0 and under Assumptions 1
and a constant tax rate τ, this condition reduces to
c2,t
c1,t
− ω = (1 − α)βν,
where the right-hand side equals Btc2,t/(νwtω1) and measures the beneﬁt from depressing capital
accumulation (and therefore tilting the consumption proﬁle). This incentive to raise taxes
increases in the capital share, households’ patience, and the population growth rate. On the
other hand, the autarky consumption proﬁle ˆ c (which enters in c2,t/c1,t, see equation (9)) also
increases in these three parameters, thereby reducing the incentive to raise taxes. The latter
eﬀect dominates.
142.4 Empirical Evidence and Signiﬁcance
The model entails a variety of predictions which we now confront with available empirical ev-
idence. We start with comparative statics results for the politico-economic equilibrium under
rational expectations, and then turn to a calibrated version of the model to assess the quanti-
tative importance of the general equilibrium eﬀects and thus, excessive redistribution.




implying that the pension share is decreasing in ν. This result ﬁnds support in the data.
Analyzing the rise of the welfare state in a sample of 30 countries during the 1880–1930 period,
Lindert (1994) ﬁnds a signiﬁcant positive relationship between the pension share and the share
of the elderly. A sample of OECD countries during the 1960s and 1970s (Lindert, 1996) and
a panel of 60 countries during the 1960–1998 period (Persson and Tabellini, 2003) produce
similar ﬁndings. Finally, Boldrin, De Nardi and Jones (2005) report cross-section and time-series
evidence of a negative relationship between fertility and social-security transfers (104 countries
in 1997, and post-war data for the U.S. and European countries, respectively). Boldrin et al.
(2005) interpret this evidence as support for their view that increased social-security transfers
caused a fall in fertility. Our model suggests a mechanism with reversed causality.14
The model also replicates the apparently non-monotone empirical relationship between the
share of elderly in the population and public pension payments per retiree: For the 1880–1930
period, Lindert (1994) estimates an elasticity of the pension share in GDP with respect to the
share of elderly that is larger than unity. The OECD data suggest a hump-shaped relationship
between the share of the elderly and public pension payments per retiree (Lindert, 1996), and
Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (2004) conclude that there is no clear relationship.15 The model
can account for these observations, because it features an inverse-U shaped relationship between
the share of elderly and public pension payments per retiree (wτWν), and because population
growth rates have declined over time. The model therefore predicts population ageing to lead
to a rise in the pension share of GDP but eventually, a decline of social-security beneﬁts per
retiree, see Figure 1. (The ﬁgure is plotted for the baseline parameter values discussed below.)
While the pension share in the model increases in α and decreases in ν, the eﬀect of changes
in α or ν on GDP per capita is ambiguous. The model therefore predicts no clear correlation
between GDP per capita on the one hand and the pension share of GDP on the other.16 Indeed,
while Lindert (1994; 1996) reports a positive relationship between the pension share and lagged
GDP per capita, Persson and Tabellini (2003) do not ﬁnd any such relationship.17
Since the political support for social security partly arises from the motivation to aﬀect
interest rates, the model predicts a negative relationship between a country’s integration with
14Forni’s (2005) model, which adopts the Markov assumption as we do but maintains the traditional median-
voter setup, counter-factually predicts higher population growth to result in a higher pension share. This suggests
that the probabilistic-voting assumption adopted here is central for the model to be able to replicate the data.
15Based on data for the United States and 12 European countries over the period 1965–92, Razin, Sadka and
Swagel (2002) argue that the dependency ratio is negatively related to per capita transfers.
16Productivity growth of the type discussed below (in the context of the calibration) aﬀects GDP per capita,
but not the pension share. Therefore, it does not give rise to a systematic relationship between the two variables
either.
17A direct test of the model’s prediction of a positive relationship between α and the pension share is diﬃcult.
Cross-sectional data on labor shares is likely to be misleading, and the sample of countries for which corrected





Figure 1: Social-security transfers as share of GDP [—] and per retiree [– –] as functions of ν.
international capital markets and its level of intergenerational transfers. To the extent that
capital- and goods-market integration go hand in hand, this prediction is also borne out in the
data, as reported by Persson and Tabellini (2003), who ﬁnd more trade to be associated with
less welfare spending.18 Similarly, time variation in the openness of the capital account should
be reﬂected in time-varying political support for social security, and the old should oppose
capital account liberalization because it reduces the elasticity of the interest rate with respect
to domestic savings and thus, strengthens young voters’ opposition against social security.
Another prediction of the model (under the assumption ω ≥ 1 − νβ(1 − α)) is that in
societies with social security systems, old households consume more than young households.
This prediction is consistent with the empirical ﬁndings reviewed by Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin
(2004) according to which the net income of a typical elderly person is at least as high as the
net income of a typical non-elderly person in most developed economies. The discrepancies in
consumption or living standards are even larger than those in net incomes.19
To quantitatively assess the model, we calibrate it. In particular, we impose Assumption 1
and set α to 0.7185, ω to unity, and ν to 1.3843, the gross growth rate of the U.S. population
between 1970 and 2000.20 To calibrate β, we use the following relationship between the model
parameters and the steady-state interest rate in politico-economic equilibrium: β = ω
R−ν(1−α).
Approximating “the” annual U.S. interest rate by a weighted average of the returns on diﬀerent
asset classes, ˜ R = 1.0483, and accounting for the fact that real-world interest rates include a
18On the other hand, it runs counter to Rodrik’s (1998) ﬁnding of a positive relationship between public spending
and trade exposure. Rodrik (1998) does not control for the share of the old as do Persson and Tabellini (2003).
He suggests that the positive relationship he ﬁnds might be due to the public sector providing social insurance
against external risk, an aspect not present in our deterministic framework.
19Alternatively, high relative consumption of old households could arise due to complementarities between
consumption and leisure.
20Piketty and Saez (2003) report estimates of α for post-war U.S. data. We use the average of their estimates
over the period 1970–2003. The population growth rate is computed based on numbers reported by the U.S.
Census Bureau. We also set A to unity.
16growth component that is absent in our model, we arrive at an adjusted annual gross interest
rate of 1.0302 and thus, β = 0.976430 = 0.4877.21
Table 1 reports the implied equilibrium values of the steady-state tax rate, capital-labor
ratio, factor prices (over thirty years), young- and old-age consumption, and life-time welfare.
Table 1: Steady-state equilibrium values
Politico-economic equilibrium Ramsey equilibrium
τ 0.1489 0.0810
s/ν 0.0495 0.0631





For the chosen parameter values, ˆ c < 1 (the autarky consumption of young households
exceeds the autarky consumption of old households) and ˆ d < 1. Both the Ramsey and the
politico-economic equilibrium therefore feature strictly positive tax rates.
The predicted tax rate in politico-economic equilibrium is slightly higher than the actual tax
rate of 12.4 percent in the United States (OASDI). This might partly be due to the fact that
in our setup with two- rather than many-period lived households, the importance of general
equilibrium eﬀects is overemphasized. In a setup with many-period lived households, the share
of social costs due to lower wages that remains unaccounted for in politico-economic equilibrium
would be smaller, but still positive; τW would therefore be closer to, but still higher than τG.
The tax rate implemented in politico-economic equilibrium is nearly twice as high as in the
Ramsey or double-myopic equilibrium. Ceteris paribus, the positive diﬀerence between τW and
τG further increases for lower values of α, higher values of β or ν, and in the presence of tax
distortions, see Figure 2 and the following section. As reported in Table 1, the politico-economic
equilibrium supports a lower capital-labor ratio, higher interest rates, lower wages, and a steeper
consumption proﬁle than the Ramsey equilibrium. (On an annual basis, the diﬀerence between
the interest rates is 58 basis points.) In terms of steady-state welfare, the move from the
21Campbell and Viceira (2005) report annualized gross returns for 90-day treasury-bills (1.0152), 5-year
treasury-bonds (1.0289), and stocks (1.0783) for the period 1952–2002. We approximate the average return
on savings by a weighted average of these returns (1.0483) where the weights are proportional to the relative
size of “deposits”, “credit market instruments”, and “equity shares at market value, directly held plus indirectly
held” in the balance sheets of households and non-proﬁt organizations (Board of Governors of the Federal Re-
serve System, Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States: Annual Flows and Outstandings, several years [we
use averages for the period 1955–2002]). In the model, productivity is constant. Relaxing this assumption, we
have At+1 = AtγA with γA > 1 rather than equal to unity. On a balanced growth path, the interest rate is
constant, implying that the capital-labor ratio grows at a gross rate of γ
1/α
A . Using (8) (which is unaﬀected
by changes in γA, as is τ
W) we conclude that, on a balanced growth path, Ats
−α
t−1 and thus, the interest rate
increase by a factor of γ
1/α
A if the gross growth rate of A increases from unity to γA. According to the Bureau of
Labor Statistics, multifactor productivity of private businesses grew by a factor of 1.8681 between 1952 and 2002
(http://www.bls.gov/mfp/home.htm, series MPU740023 (K)). This implies γA = 1.0126.
17Ramsey equilibrium to the politico-economic equilibrium is equivalent to a permanent reduction








Figure 2: (Unconstrained) τW [—] and τG [– –] as functions of ν.
Table 2 reports the results of robustness checks. We consider the eﬀects of changes in ˜ R (to
assess the consequences of potential problems with our return measure), ω, and α (we replace the
average of the labor shares reported by Piketty and Saez (2003) by their average plus/minus one
standard deviation). Moreover, we numerically solve for the equilibrium under the assumption
of CIES preferences with an intertemporal elasticity of substitution, ε, diﬀerent from unity.22
In all cases, the central ﬁndings are robust: equilibrium taxes are positive, and redistribution
is excessive. With non-logarithmic preferences, ε < 1 (ε > 1), the tax function is negatively
(positively) sloped.
3 Elastic Labor Supply and Multiple Policy Instruments
Previous literature has argued that the sustainability of intergenerational transfers hinges on the
general equilibrium eﬀects of depressed capital accumulation. The model of the previous section
suggests that general equilibrium eﬀects are important for the size of equilibrium transfers, but
not essential for their existence. Both results raise the question of whether alternative policies
exist to depress aggregate savings and, if so, whether social-security transfers continue to be
sustained in a more general setup allowing for such alternative policies. The probabilistic-voting
assumption allows us to further pursue these questions.
We examine the robustness of the support for social security in an extended framework with
endogenous labor supply, tax distortions, and two political transfer choices. More speciﬁcally,
we extend the model in two directions. First, we introduce an endogenous labor-leisure choice.
Labor income taxes therefore depress aggregate savings twofold, by reducing young households’
22We only report the results for ε = 0.5. Vissing-Jørgensen (2002) estimates ε to be 0.3-0.4 for stockholders
and 0.8-1.0 for bondholders.
18Table 2: Steady-state politico-economic equilibrium values
˜ R ω α ε
Baseline 1.0583 1.0383 1.2 0.7320 0.7050 0.5
τ 0.1489 0.1604 0.1325 0.2021 0.1673 0.1297 0.1395
s/ν 0.0495 0.0333 0.0739 0.0495 0.0483 0.0507 0.0452
R 2.4399 3.2440 1.8302 2.4399 2.4636 2.4156 2.6037
w 0.3083 0.2758 0.3451 0.3083 0.3250 0.2924 0.3005
c1 0.1939 0.1854 0.1971 0.1775 0.2038 0.1844 0.1960
c2 0.2307 0.2108 0.2504 0.2535 0.2399 0.2219 0.2211
wealth after taxes, as in the model of the previous section, and by distorting young households’
propensity to consume goods rather than leisure out of disposable wealth.23 Second, we introduce
an additional tax, levied at rate θt, on labor income whose revenue is reimbursed to young
households. In the previous setup with inelastic labor supply, such a tax-cum-reimbursement
would have had no eﬀects. With elastic labor supply, in contrast, the new instrument makes it
possible to subsidize leisure consumption and thus, monopolize labor supply and savings of the
young without having to transfer resources to the old.
For tractability, we assume a young household’s felicity function to be separable in consump-
tion and leisure, xt. The indirect utility function deﬁned in (1) is thus replaced by
Ut = max
st,xt
u(c1,t) + v(xt) + βu(c2,t+1) s.t. household budget set,
where v(·) is continuously diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing and concave, and satisﬁes limx→0 v′(x) =
∞. A young household’s time endowment is normalized to one. While the tax revenues
wt(1 − xt)τt continue to fund social security, the additional tax revenues wt(1 − xt)θt fund
a lump-sum transfer to young households. The budget constraint of a young household thus
reads
wt(1 − xt)(1 − τt − θt) + Tt = c1,t + st,
where, in equilibrium, Tt = wt(1 − xt)θt. Second-period consumption is still given by c2,t+1 =
stRt+1 + bt+1, where bt+1 = νwt+1τt+1(1 − xt+1).24
Optimal savings and labor supply decisions of a young household are characterized by the
ﬁrst-order conditions
u′(c1,t) = βu′(c2,t+1)Rt+1,
u′(c1,t)wt(1 − τt − θt) = v′(xt),
23A capital income or savings tax fails to depress capital accumulation in our benchmark economy with log-
arithmic preferences. If the income eﬀect outweighed the substitution eﬀect, such a tax would even encourage
savings.
24To capture the dependency of beneﬁts on individual labor supply, the beneﬁt function can be generalized to
bt+1 = νwt+1τt+1(1−Xt+1)
1−xt
1−Xt, with 1−X denoting aggregate labor supply. While this aﬀects the household’s
intratemporal ﬁrst-order condition, the analysis still goes through without major changes.
19subject to the budget set described earlier. Conditional on the anticipated values for taxes and
leisure, τ(st), θ(st), and ˜ X(st), respectively, the household’s ﬁrst-order conditions and budget
constraint map st−1, aggregate savings and leisure as well as the contemporaneous tax rates into
the optimal leisure and savings choice of an individual household, Xi(·) and Si(·), respectively.
Equilibrium aggregate savings and leisure functions, S(·) and X(·), respectively, are deﬁned as
ﬁxed points of the functional equations
S(st−1,τt,θt;τ(·),θ(·)) = Si(st−1,τt,θt,X(·),S(·);τ(S(·)),θ(S(·)), ˜ X(S(·))),
X(st−1,τt,θt;τ(·),θ(·)) = Xi(st−1,τt,θt,X(·),S(·);τ(S(·)),θ(S(·)), ˜ X(S(·))),
∀st−1 ≥ 0, 0 ≤ τt,θt, τt + θt ≤ 1.




Wθ(st−1,τt,θt;τ(·),θ(·)) ≡ ω2u(c2,t) + ω1ν(u(c1,t) + v(xt) + βu(c2,t+1))
subject to

        








In a rational expectations equilibrium, the anticipated policy functions coincide with the optimal
ones; moreover, evaluated at the equilibrium policy functions, X(·) is consistent with ˜ X(·). The







Does society still choose to sustain social security in this environment? Or does the option
to depress aggregate savings without having to shift resources to the old lead to a collapse of the
support for intergenerational transfers? In Appendix A.4, we show that the second alternative
can generally be rejected under plausible conditions. Here, we focus directly on the special case
of logarithmic preferences in consumption and Cobb-Douglas technology, since this allows us to
characterize the politico-economic equilibrium in closed form.
Assumption 2. Preferences are logarithmic in consumption: u(c) ≡ ln(c). The production
function is of the Cobb-Douglas type: w(st−1,xt) ≡ Aα(st−1/(ν(1 − xt)))1−α, R(st−1,xt) ≡
A(1 − α)(st−1/(ν(1 − xt)))−α.
Under Assumption 2, equilibrium savings and consumption choices are given by
st = s1−α
t−1 (1 − xt)α · z(τt,τt+1),
c1,t = s1−α
t−1 (1 − xt)α · γ(τt,τt+1),
c2,t = s1−α
t−1 (1 − xt)α · δ(τt),
20where functions z(·), γ(·), and δ(·) have been deﬁned earlier, and where τt+1 in politico-economic
equilibrium is a function of st. Moreover, the household’s intratemporal optimality condition
yields
v′(xt) =
1 − τt − θt
(1 − xt)(1 − τt) −
β(1−α)(1−xt)(1−τt)
(1−α)(1+β)+ατt+1
and thus, an expression for leisure as a function of τt, θt, and τt+1, but not (directly) of st−1:
xt = x(τt,θt,τt+1). (10)






ln[1 − xt] + ln[1 − xt+1]νβ + ln[1 − xt+2]ν2β2 + ...
  (1 + ν)α
1 − νβ(1 − α)
+
 




i=t) + h(xt) + h(xt+1)νβ + h(xt+2)ν2β2 + ... subject to (10),
where the function G(·) has been deﬁned earlier and h(x) ≡ νv(x) + ln(1 − x)
(1+ν)α
1−νβ(1−α). The







+ ζi = 0, i > t,
h′(xi)(νβ)i−t∂xi
∂θi
+ χi = 0, i > t,
where ζi and χi denote the non-negative multipliers associated with the non-negativity con-
straints on tax rates. These conditions imply that the steady-state Ramsey social-security tax
rate is lower in the new environment, τ ≤ max(0,τG).25 Absent non-negativity constraints on
tax rates, the government would impose the same social-security tax rate as in the main model
and eliminate the distortions caused by a non-zero social-security tax rate by setting θt equal to
−τt. The non-negativity constraints render such a strategy unfeasible. Balancing its allocative
and distributive goals, the government therefore reduces the social-security tax rate.
The politically determined social-security tax rate, in contrast, does not change in the new
environment. To see this, consider Wθ(st−1,τt,θt;τt+1,θt+1), the objective of a vote-maximizing
candidate that anticipates ﬂat future policy functions and thus, future labor-supply choices
independent of the capital-labor ratio. Under Assumption 2, Wθ(·) is given by
Wθ(st−1,τt,θt;τt+1,θt+1)
= W(st−1,τt;τt+1) + ln[1 − xt]α(ω + ν + (1 − α)βν) + νv(xt) + ln[1 − xt+1]ανβ
subject to (10)
= W(st−1,τt;τt+1) + g(xt) + ln[1 − xt+1]ανβ subject to (10),
25To see this, denote the tax rates that solve the Ramsey program in steady state by τ and θ, respectively, and
ﬁrst assume that τ,θ > 0 such that ζ = χ = 0. This implies (since ∂xi/∂θi  = 0) that h





G)) = 0 ⇒ θ =
ν(1+β)(1−α)−α
α(1+ν) = −τ
G, yielding a contradiction. At least one of the two tax rates must
therefore be zero. If the social-security tax rate is zero, the result immediately follows. Otherwise, θ = 0 and
τ > 0. The second ﬁrst-order condition then implies h
′(xt) ≤ 0 (since
∂xi(τi,0,τi+1)






∂τi = 0 (since
∂xi(τi,0,τi+1)
∂τi = 0). Since
∂xi(τi,0,τi+1)
∂τi+1 > 0, we conclude that
∂G( )
∂τi ≥ 0 and thus, due to monotonicity of
∂G( )
∂τi , that τ ≤ max(0,τ
G).












with equalities if the solution is interior. If the optimal tax rate θt > 0, then the optimal policy
features the same τt as in the main model, max(0,τW), since ∂xt/∂θt > 0 implies g′(xt) = 0.
The optimal θt is then pinned down by the condition g′(x(max(0,τW),θt,max(0,τW))) = 0.26
Alternatively, if the optimal tax rate θt = 0, then
∂xt(τt,0,τt+1)
∂τt = 0 and the ﬁrst condition once
more implies the same choice of social-security tax rate as in the main model. As a consequence,
the same ﬂat policy function τ(·) as in the main model arises, implying that θ(·) is ﬂat as
well and labor-supply is independent of the state variable, conﬁrming the initial guess. Rather
than seeing θt as a complementary policy instrument to neutralize the distortions caused by
the social-security tax (as the Ramsey government does, although it is unable to implement
the desired policy mix due to the non-negativity constraints), the political process chooses θt to
maximize the welfare of current voters; the induced negative welfare eﬀects on future generations
again remain unaccounted for. Our benchmark parameter values imply an equilibrium tax rate
θW = 0.0108 for an arbitrary choice of preferences v(x). We summarize these ﬁndings as follows:
Proposition 5. Suppose that Assumption 2 holds.
(i) The steady-state social-security tax rate implemented by the Ramsey government is lower
than in the main model.
(ii) There exists a politico-economic equilibrium with ﬂat policy functions. The social-
security tax rate in that equilibrium is the same as in the main model, τ(s) = max(τW,0).
(iii) The ﬂat policy functions are the unique equilibrium policy functions in the limit of the
ﬁnite-horizon economy.
For the uniqueness result under (iii), consider the ﬁnal period, T, in the ﬁnite-horizon econ-
omy. The consumption of old and young households in T is given by
c1,T = wT(1 − xT)(1 − τT) = s1−α
T−1A(1 − xT)αανα−1(1 − τT),
c2,T = s1−α
T−1A(1 − xT)ανα(1 − α(1 − τT)),
































with equality for an interior solution. These conditions, together with the household’s intratem-
poral optimality condition
v′(xT) =
1 − τT − θT
(1 − xT)(1 − τT)
,
26Since g
′(x) is decreasing in x, the condition is “stable”; low θt and thus xt imply that dg/dx > 0, pushing xt
and thus θt upwards, and vice versa.
22imply that the tax rates at time T and thus, also the labor supply, are independent of the capital-







∂τT in the ﬁrst-order condition
with respect to τT vanishes for the reasons discussed earlier. Therefore, the same τT as in the
main model results, τT(sT−1) = max(
αω−(1−α)ν
α(ω+ν) ,0), and the optimal θT satisﬁes θT(sT−1) =
max((1 − τT)(1 − α(ν + ω)),0). Having established that the policy functions in period T are
ﬂat, the arguments employed before imply the same for all earlier periods.
Returning to the question motivating this section, we ﬁrst conclude that society sustains
social security even in an environment with endogenous labor supply, distorting taxes, and
alternative policy instruments. In that sense, the political support for social-security transfers
is robust. Second, we conclude that the benevolent government, but not the political process,
reduces intergenerational transfers in response to the presence of tax distortions. Excessive
redistribution in politico-economic equilibrium is therefore even more pronounced than in the
main model.
4 Conclusion
We have argued that the political support for intergenerational transfers reﬂects the interests of
all voters rather than a young median voter alone. The micropolitical foundation for that view—
probabilistic voting, i.e., a non-deterministic relationship between candidates’ platforms and
citizens’ voting behavior—is natural and has realistic implications. Introducing the probabilistic-
voting assumption in the standard Diamond (1965) model preserves that model’s tractability
and delivers intuitive and novel results in a strikingly transparent fashion.
It is often argued in the policy discussion that cuts in social-security beneﬁts in response to
population ageing herald the dismantling of pay-as-you-go social security systems. According
to the model, in contrast, the size of social security programs is positively related to the old-age
dependency ratio, even if pensions per retiree as a function of the old-age dependency ratio are
hump-shaped. These model predictions are consistent with the data. Therefore, we have reason
to expect population ageing to go hand-in-hand both with further increases in the size of social
security systems and reductions of beneﬁts per retiree.
Normative implications of the model also accord well with frequently expressed notions in
the social-security debate, according to which intergenerational transfers are unfairly high, due
to a lack of political representation of future generations. While the political process in our
model is “inclusive” in the sense of representing the interests of all voters, it is not suﬃciently
inclusive from a broader social welfare point of view that also accounts for the interests of future
cohorts. In eﬀect, political competition in the model partially resolves the conﬂict between old
and young voters by shifting some of the cost of the social security system to future generations.
As a consequence, the social security system is too large relative to a system balancing the
interests of all generations.
Since the model is very tractable, it lends itself to a variety of interesting extensions. We
have discussed one, central extension with endogenous labor supply, tax distortions, and mul-
tiple policy instruments. Another extension, due to Song (2005), features intragenerational
heterogeneity and analyzes the interaction between social-security transfers and wealth inequal-
ity. Other possible extensions might analyze the interaction between social security policy and
various other policies or household choices. Examples of the former include public education,
publicly provided intergenerational risk sharing, or immigration restrictions; examples of the
latter include fertility or portfolio choices.
23In ongoing work, we relax the assumption of a balanced government budget and allow for gov-
ernment debt, introducing political deﬁcit and default choices. We show the politico-economic
equilibrium to sustain arbitrary combinations of government debt, social-security transfers, and
taxes as long as the policy mix is equivalent in terms of the allocation it supports to the transfer
policies characterized in this paper. In other words, the economic equivalence between social
security and debt-plus-tax policies extends to the political sphere, and the results presented here
therefore apply under much more general conditions.
24A Appendix
A.1 Relationship Between Social Planner and Ramsey Allocation
Let nt+i ≡ ρt+i−1(νβu′(c2,t+i)−ρu′(c1,t+i)) denote the net social beneﬁt of transferring one unit
of resources in period t+i from young to old households. From (5), the planner’s optimal policy
is to set nt+i = 0,i ≥ 0.
Let It+i denote the eﬀect on the objective function of a marginal increase in savings in period
t + i. Under the Ramsey policy, It+i equals27
IG
t+i = w′





t+i+2(τt+i+2 − 1)nt+i+2 + ....
Higher savings (i) raise the wage and thus transfers in the next period and (ii) reduce the interest
rate. The corresponding welfare eﬀects are (i) βρt+iνw′
t+i+1τt+i+1u′(c2,t+i+1) on account of the
old, ρt+i+1w′
t+i+1(1−τt+i+1)u′(c1,t+i+1) on account of the young, and (ii) βρt+ist+iR′
t+i+1u′(c2,t+i+1)
on account of the old.28 The initial increase in savings is also propagated over time through
higher wages and savings, and thus causes parallel welfare eﬀects in subsequent periods. Using
the constant-returns-to-scale property R′(s)s + w′(s)ν = 0, the expression for IG
t+i results.
With IG
t+i thus representing the shadow value of a marginal increase in savings, the Ramsey






















t+i denotes the non-negative multiplier on the constraint that τt+i be non-negative.29
The ﬁrst term on the left-hand side represents the direct welfare gain and loss for old and young
households, respectively, due to higher transfers. The second term represents the welfare eﬀects
caused by the adjustment in savings resulting from higher taxes (and thus, lower disposable
income). The third term represents the welfare eﬀects caused by the adjustment in the savings in
the preceding period, resulting from higher current taxes (and thus transfers).30 Since nt+i+s =
0,s ≥ 1, implies that IG
t+i = 0, the distribution of consumption implemented by the social
planner, nt+i+s = 0,s ≥ 0, satisﬁes the Ramsey ﬁrst-order condition as long as the non-negativity
constraint on tax rates does not bind.31 Moreover, since the savings choices induced by the
Ramsey policy conform with the social planner’s investment policy, the consumption levels of
old and young households in the social-planner allocation and an interior Ramsey equilibrium
also coincide.
27We use the short-hand notation St to denote S(wt(1−τt);τt+1). w and R denote wage and return as functions
of aggregate savings. A prime denotes the ﬁrst derivative.
28There is no direct welfare eﬀect from induced changes in savings, since savings choices are privately optimal.
29We do not impose an upper bound on the tax rate. Since limc→0 u
′(c) = ∞, however, and since, in equilibrium,
households cannot borrow against future beneﬁts (the capital stock must be non-negative), tax rates will always
be lower than unity in equilibrium.
30The ﬁrst-order condition with respect to the tax rate in the initial period, τt, does not feature the third term
in (11), since st−1 is predetermined. The implications for time-consistency are discussed below.
31This would even be the case if the savings choices under the Ramsey policy conﬂicted with the social planner’s
investment policy, since the shadow value of a marginal increase in savings in an interior Ramsey equilibrium
equals zero.
25An interior Ramsey policy therefore implements the social-planner allocation. By impli-
cation, it is necessarily time-consistent. This can also be seen from (11): If nt+i = 0,i ≥ 0,
and therefore IG
t+i = 0, the terms in square brackets in (11) add up to zero, and the potential
source of time inconsistency—the eﬀect of a change in tax rate on savings in the preceding
period—disappears.
A.2 Time-Consistency of Ramsey Policy
The ﬁrst-order condition of a benevolent government without commitment diﬀers from (11) in
two respects: First, since the government takes future tax choices to be functions of the state,
it only chooses the contemporaneous tax rate, τt. Second, since changes in savings do not only























































t = 0, λ
˜ G
t τt = 0, (12)
where λ
˜ G
t denotes the non-negative multiplier on the constraint that τt be non-negative. Since
nt+i = 0,i ≥ 1, implies that I
˜ G
t = 0, and since the implementability constraints under the
Ramsey policy and the policy without commitment are identical (conditional on tax rates), (12)
conﬁrms that an interior Ramsey policy is time-consistent.
To see that the Ramsey policy is time-consistent even if the non-negativity constraint on
tax rates is binding, consider the program of the benevolent government without commitment.























t τt = 0, λ
˜ G
t+1τt+1 = 0.
If the policy function is diﬀerentiable, then λ
˜ G
t+1τ′
t+1 = 0 (since taxes are non-negative) and the
third term in the left-hand equation is weakly negative. The equation can therefore be satisﬁed
under the autarky allocation nt < 0 and a binding non-negativity constraint (τt = 0, λ
˜ G
t > 0).
A strictly positive τt, in contrast, necessarily violates the condition, because an increase in τt
from zero renders nt further negative, but implies that λ
˜ G
t = 0. We conclude that the benevolent
government without commitment chooses τt = 0 ∀t and therefore, that the Ramsey policy is
time-consistent.
32St now serves as short-hand notation for S(wt(1 − τt); ˜ τ( )), i.e., the savings function of households that
anticipate future governments to implement the tax policy ˜ τ( ).
26A.3 Lemma
Lemma 1. Under Assumption 1, and for a continuously diﬀerentiable policy function, there
is at least one non-trivial steady state. Furthermore, if τ′(s) = 0 at a steady state, then this
steady state is stable with monotone dynamics.
Proof. Under Assumption 1, the law of motion for aggregate savings is implicitly given by (8).
































− λt + µt = 1 − Bt
c1,t
νwtω1 − λt + µt, (14)
where Bt denotes the indirect welfare eﬀects and λt,µt denote the non-negative multipliers asso-






(1 − α)(1 + β) + ατ(st) + αstτ′(st)
. (15)













(1 − α)(1 + β) + ατ(st)
 
. (16)
First, we will show that there exists at least one non-trivial steady state. Continuity of
st(st−1) implies that st−1 → 0 ⇒ st → 0; diﬀerentiability and boundedness of the policy function
imply limst−1→0 st−1τ′(st−1) = limst→0 stτ′(st) = 0. Since s−α
t−1 approaches inﬁnity as st−1 → 0,
limst−1→0
dst
dst−1 is larger than unity iﬀ limst−1→0 τ(st−1) = τ(0) < 1 (see (13)). This condition
is necessarily satisﬁed because the alternative possibility, τ(0) = 1, leads to a contradiction.
(On the one hand, if τ(0) = 1, then, from (14), limst−1→0 ω
c1,t
c2,t ≥ 1. On the other hand, from
(16), limst−1→0
c1,t
c2,t = 0.) From (8), limst−1→∞
st
st−1 = 0. It follows that there exists at least one
non-trivial steady state.

























If the policy function is ﬂat at the steady state, τ′(s) = 0, then 0 < dst
dst−1|steady state = 1−α < 1,
implying stability of the steady state and monotone dynamics.
A.4 Elastic Labor Supply and Tax Distortions
For convenience, we treat Tt and the sum of the two tax rates, σt ≡ τt + θt, rather than τt and
θt as the independent political choice variables. Old age beneﬁts and the composition of tax
27rates are implicitly deﬁned. Otherwise, the objective function pursued by the political parties,
the implementability constraints, and the conditions for a rational expectations equilibrium are
identical to those in the text.
Consider the eﬀect of a marginal increase in Tt, which consists of three parts:
i. The direct welfare eﬀect due to lower transfers from young to old households,
−ν(ωu′(c2,t) − u′(c1,t)).
ii. The welfare eﬀect on young voters due to lower aggregate savings. This eﬀect parallels the










iii. The welfare eﬀects on young and old voters due to changes in the labor supply. These








(1 − xt)(1 − σt)(ωu′(c2,t) − u′(c1,t))
 
,
where we use the household’s intratemporal optimality condition as well as the constant
returns to scale property. The terms in curly brackets represent the loss for old households
from lower social-security beneﬁts (due to lower labor supply), and the general equilibrium
welfare eﬀects on young and old households. Higher wages (due to lower labor supply)
beneﬁt young households and also old households (due to the eﬀect on pensions) but, at
the same time, old households suﬀer from lower returns on their savings. Due to constant
returns to scale, this latter eﬀect is proportional to the change in wages.34
(The eﬀects of a marginal increase in σt closely resemble the terms above. The term in i. is
multiplied by −wt(1 − xt), and in the expressions in ii. and iii., the derivatives with respect to
Tt are replaced by the derivatives with respect to σt.)
The second of the above three eﬀects is negative if conditions parallel to those relevant for
Proposition 2 are satisﬁed. In particular, the eﬀect is negative if aggregate savings increase in
the lump-sum subsidy Tt, and if depressing aggregate savings is beneﬁcial for the young. The
ﬁrst of the three eﬀects is negative if ωu′(c2,t)−u′(c1,t) is positive, i.e., if old households consume
relatively little. Finally, the third eﬀect is negative if ωu′(c2,t)−u′(c1,t) is positive and leisure is
a normal good on the aggregate level, i.e., if an increase in Tt reduces young households’ labor
supply. In sum, this suggests that starting from an autarky allocation satisfying ωu′(c2,t) >
u′(c1,t) (a suﬃcient condition for which is, c2,t ≤ c1,t in autarky and ω ≥ 1), the political process
does not introduce transfers to the young but does sustain transfers to the old if dX/dσ ≤ 0 and
dS/dσ ≤ 0. Even if the young might prefer the distorting labor income tax to fund a lump-sum
transfer to themselves, the vote maximizing policy is to fund social security. If, due to social
security payments to the old, the politico-economic equilibrium features relatively high old-age
consumption (ωu′(c2,t) < u′(c1,t)), then optimal Tt might diﬀer from zero, as found in the text
under Assumption 2.
33St and Xt denote S(st−1,σt,Tt;σ( ),T( )) and X(st−1,σt,Tt;σ( ),T( )), respectively.
34The welfare loss for young households from lower consumption (due to lower labor supply) and the welfare
gain from higher leisure consumption exactly oﬀset each other.
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